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Abstract 
 
This article evaluates the impact of New Labour’s ‘modernization project’ on 
two key non-departmental public bodies for sport, Sport England and UK 
Sport. Our analysis concentrates on identifying the sources of the general 
momentum for modernization in the sport sector, how it has been interpreted 
by government in relation to the two organizations, the nature and 
consequences of modernization for both organizations, and the future of 
modernization. The analysis is informed by a range of public documents 
produced by government and by the two sports agencies, together with a 
series of seven interviews conducted with senior staff and members of Sport 
England and UK Sport and with senior civil servants in the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport. Our conclusions suggest that modernization has 
resulted in a narrowing of the two organizations’ objectives, the adoption of 
business-like principles and a ‘command and control’ regime in relationships 
with key front line delivery partners. 
 
 
 [A]Introduction 
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Over the past 20 years one of the constant themes in sport policy discussions 
has been the fragmentation, fractiousness and perceived ineffectiveness of 
organizations within the sport policy area. While much of government’s focus 
has been on the inadequacies of the national governing bodies of sport 
(NGBs) the main national agencies of government have also been subject to 
sustained criticism both by the major political parties and by NGBs. The sports 
councils that cover England, currently Sport England and UK Sport,1 have 
been reviewed at least seven times in the last two decades with a new round 
of criticism, mainly from NGBs, but also from the Central Council of Physical 
Recreation and the British Olympic Association, prompted by the award of the 
2012 Olympic Games to London. Over the years the critics have accused the 
sports councils of being: unresponsive to the needs of their clients; overly 
bureaucratic and complex, especially in relation to the accessing of funds; and 
incoherent due to overlapping responsibilities, the lack of strategic clarity and 
the generation of an excess of, often short-term, initiatives. In brief, the 
national sports system has long been seen as in serious need of reform. 
 
However, the discussion of reform of the national sports system in general 
and the modernization of Sport England and UK Sport in particular needs to 
be located alongside a number of recent analyses of change in domestic sport 
policy. Macro-level analyses have emphasized variously the significance for 
domestic policy of globalization (Houlihan 2004; Maguire 1999), the 
intensification of the commodification of sport (Gerrard 2004), and the 
symbolic significance of elite sporting success (Green and Houlihan 2005). 
Meso-level analyses have sought to explain policy change in terms of 
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tensions between national and local policy actors (McDonald 1995), the 
weakness of the policy community (Roche 1993), the emergence of advocacy 
coalitions (Green and Houlihan 2004), the opportunities presented for policy 
entrepreneurs within a policy sector with few interests strongly rooted within 
the machinery of government (Houlihan and Green 2006), and the interplay of 
competing policy discourses (McDonald 2000; Penney and Evans 1999). The 
following discussion of the government’s concern with institutional 
modernization in relation to sport complements and informs many of these 
macro and meso-level analyses, but also provides an opportunity to evaluate 
the significance of modernization as an independent variable in the 
explanation of sport policy.  
 
The election of the Labour Government in 1997 committed to modernization 
of public policymaking and of the institutions of government was unlikely to 
leave the sport policy infrastructure undisturbed. The aim of this article is to 
evaluate the impact of New Labour’s modernization project (cf. Finlayson, 
2003a, 2003b) on two key non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) for sport, 
Sport England and UK Sport. In particular, we are concerned to identify the 
sources of the general momentum for modernization in the sport sector, how it 
has been interpreted by government in relation to the two organizations, the 
nature and consequences of modernization for the two organizations, and the 
future of modernization. The research is based on an analysis of a range of 
public documents produced by government and by the two sports agencies. 
The analysis of documents was supplemented by a series of seven recorded 
and transcribed interviews conducted with senior staff and members of Sport 
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England and UK Sport and with senior civil servants in the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). 
 
[A]Modernization: rhetoric and substance 
 
According to the government, modernization involves ‘ensuring that policy-
making is more joined up and strategic; making sure that public service users, 
not providers, are the focus, by matching services more closely to people’s 
lives; delivering public services that are high quality and efficient’ (Cabinet 
Office 1999, pp. 6-7; Burton 2006). Beyond this and similar general 
statements (e.g. see Blair 2002) it is difficult to specify more precisely the 
content of modernization. Indeed, Finlayson argues that modernization is 
essentially a rhetorical discourse which is less concerned with describing or 
prescribing a particular set of practices and more concerned with persuasion 
and motivation (see also Harrison 2002). For Finlayson (2003b, p. 63) 
modernization ‘is an “up” word, that makes things sound exciting, progressive 
and positive’. 
 
Despite the lack of precision the concept of modernization is not merely 
rhetorical and is far from content-less. A wide range of public services have 
experienced modernization, including local government (Pratchett 2002; 
Wilson 2003; Cochrane 2004), health (Harrison 2002), welfare services 
(Humphrey 2003; Lewis 2005), public libraries (Newman and McKee 2005) 
and environmental planning (Blowers 2002). From a review of the experience 
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of these services it is possible to build a picture of the themes, principles, 
technologies and narratives associated with modernization.  
 
As a cluster of themes it is associated with responsiveness, managerialism, 
responsibilization, teamworking, choice, innovation and citizen-centredness; 
at a more concrete level it is a set of principles associated with confidence in 
the market and the development of partnership, participation, stakeholding 
and social inclusion; as a set of technologies or tools it is associated with 
public service agreements, inspection, ‘naming and shaming’ and audit; and 
finally, as a narrative it is has helped to frame negatively the recent history of 
professional-bureaucratic government, to problematize current practices, to 
privilege managerial knowledge, and to equate modernization with social 
progress. The apparent breadth of the specification of modernization is a 
product of a conscious pragmatism in its interpretation. Indeed, as Flynn 
(1999, p. 585) observes, the government is ‘proud of its pragmatism’ and has 
argued that ‘What matters is what works’ (Cabinet Office 1999, p. 40). But 
Flynn (1999, p. 596) also notes that while Labour’s concept of modernization 
is ‘eclectic and pragmatic’ it is so within ‘a narrow range’. 
 
The roots of modernization lie partly in the evolution of British social 
democracy and particularly in the redefinition of Labour Party socialism such 
that the key indicator of progress was no longer the expansion of the public 
sector but rather the ‘progressive expansion of the sphere of individual 
responsibility’ (Leadbetter, quoted in Finlayson 1999, p. 273; see also Temple 
2000). However, the genealogy of modernization can be traced most strongly 
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through Thatcherism and the promotion of managerialism in the 1990s with 
the concern of the Labour Government being to retain the neo-liberal 
economic gains of Thatcherism and build upon the Conservative’s 
managerialist legacy.  
 
Modernization consequently has firm roots in the new right’s inability to 
conceptualize public organizations and professionals in anything other than 
negative terms and their concern to promote managerialism with its 
unquestioned assumptions about the superiority of private sector values and 
practices over those operating in the public sector (Osborne and Gaebler 
1992; see Cochrane 2004, for a review of the new right critique and Llewellyn 
2001, for a discussion of the narrative of modernization and how it shaped 
perceptions of traditional public sector management). However, in adapting 
managerialism to modernization New Labour put greater emphasis on long-
term effectiveness rather than short-term efficiency, on developing a set of 
techniques and tools for effecting policy change rather than simply achieving 
institutional reform, and on collaboration rather than exclusively on 
competition (Flynn 2000, p. 47).  
 
For Pratchett (2002, p. 331), at the heart of the modernization agenda is ‘A 
dual emphasis on democratic renewal and continuous service improvement’. 
Part of that democratic renewal is citizen and stakeholder engagement which 
is deemed essential because ‘in the past too many initiatives were imposed 
from the top down, and not locally owned by staff and users’ (Cabinet Office, 
1998, p. 1). While the concern to empower communities and government 
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agencies is, in part, an element in the process of democratic renewal it is also 
a consequence of the acknowledgement by government that it no longer has 
the capacity for the detailed planning and delivery of policies from the centre 
in relation to complex social problems. For Rhodes (1994) the outcome is a 
hollowed-out state where policy is made within increasingly self-governing 
networks. Consequently, individual units of government and staff are being 
made more responsible for their activities and given greater autonomy.  
 
However, there is a strong element of ‘centralist conditionality’ (Game 1998, 
p. 26) in the granting of autonomy. Autonomy is earned not simply by being 
compliant, but by being both excellent and a model or beacon for other 
organizations. The implication of this process is that the hollowed-out state is 
being replaced by a ‘smart state’ (Painter 1999, p. 96) where the focus is on 
‘governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and 
sanctions of government’ (Wilson 2003, p. 318; see also Taylor 2000; Saward 
1997; Dowding 1995). This is a particular strategy, redolent of advanced 
liberal democracies, of ‘government at a distance’ (Rose 1999, p. 49). 
 
Modernization, as continuous service improvement not only introduces a 
substantial array of technologies of audit and inspection, but also has the 
more significant effect of incorporating, within the realm of business, aspects 
of public and voluntary activity that previously operated under distinct and 
non-commercial norms and values. As du Gay (2000, p. 66) notes, ‘In keeping 
with the rationality of entrepreneurial governance, performance management 
and related techniques function as forms of “responsibilization” which are held 
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to be both economically desirable and personally “empowering”’. The 
emphasis on ‘empowerment’ and ‘earned autonomy’ is the particular 
discursive frame within which modernization is presented (cf. Davies 2006). 
According to Peri 6 et al. it is in large part a consequence of a significant 
degree of arrogance among the government’s modernizing zealots who are 
frequently unsympathetic towards (and uncomprehending of) the context 
within which delivery agencies, such as local authorities, schools, national 
sport agencies and national governing bodies of sport, operate leading them 
to assume that ‘only the most relentless regime of inspection, incentive, 
sanction and discipline will produce effective action. This type of impatience 
results from a lack of trust’ (Peri 6 et al. 2002, p. 99).  
 
Indeed, it is the long-term erosion of trust in public service professionals and 
confidence in traditional public service bureaucracy which has created the 
cultural space for the modernization discourse to take root (Cochrane 2004; 
Davies 2006; Pollitt 1993; Hoggett 1996; O’Neill 2002). Trust, as the primary 
basis of the relationship between the public and public sector professionals, 
has been replaced by supposedly neutral techniques and objective measures 
of progress such as audit, inspection and service agreements which are 
underpinned by a set of values including ‘independent validation, efficiency, 
rationality, visibility, almost irrespective of the mechanics of the practice’ 
(Power 1993, p. 17) thus substituting ‘confidence in systems for trust in 
individuals’ (O’Neill 2002, p. 481, original emphasis). 
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The apparent paradox between the rhetoric of empowerment and autonomy 
on the one hand and the strengthening of the government’s capacity to set the 
strategic direction for policy and also micro-manage the activities of units of 
the state on the other, has a strong resonance with the debates on power and 
the state associated with interpretation of Foucault’s work on governmentality 
(see for example Rose and Miller 1992; Raco and Imrie 2000; Burchell 1993; 
Dean 1999, 2007; Rose 1999). In line with these writers, power ‘does not only 
act upon people, but through them, harnessing their desires and choices to 
achieve the sought-after social order’ (Davies 2006, p. 252). Rather than 
debating whether the power of the state has been hollowed-out, or dispersed 
through a plurality of sports agencies as noted earlier, our attention is directed 
to the kinds of knowledge and technologies through which social activity 
(sport) is regulated, and through which actors – athletes, coaches, sport 
scientists, institutions – are constituted as self-disciplining subjects. The 
comment by Rose and Miller (1992, p. 174) that ‘Power is not so much a 
matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of “making up” citizens 
capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom’ applies equally to NGBs, 
sports councils and their staff. As Raco and Imrie (2000, p. 2191) comment, 
‘increasingly, government seeks not to govern society per se, but to promote 
individual and institutional conduct that is consistent with government 
objectives’. The key aim is make voluntary organizations, user groups and 
indeed quangos fit partners for government.  
 
Programmes, such as modernization, depict or re-present spheres of activity 
in ways which are essentially self-validating. As Rose and Miller (1992, p. 
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183) observe, ‘they make the objects of government thinkable in such a way 
that their ills appear susceptible to diagnosis, prescription and cure by 
calculating and normalizing intervention’. Programmes are operationalized 
through the application of various technologies of government including audit, 
benchmarking, public service agreements, target-setting and performance 
reviews and measurement. Audit, for example, is the process of producing 
auditable objects, a normative commitment which ‘hardens into the routines of 
practice a new regulatory common sense’ (Power 1997, p. 138). The net 
effect of the application of these technologies is to ensure that organizations 
are instrumental in their own self-government and engaged in the reflexive 
monitoring of their organization’s actions such that they are able to ‘account 
for what they do when asked to do so by others’ (Giddens 1995, p. 35). Thus 
power is exercised not only by the ‘ability to demand accounts’ (Power 1997, 
p. 146) but also in the deep sense of obligation to provide them even if this 
involves ‘divert[ing] resources from what they do to processes of accounting 
for what they do’ (Clarke, Gewirtz, Hughes and Humphrey 2000, p. 256). 
 
[A]Modernization and sport  
 
In marked contrast to the Conservative government’s 1995 policy document, 
Sport: Raising the Game (DNH 1995), where the engine of change was to be 
a combination of passionate commitment and the funds from the proposed 
National Lottery, the Labour Government policy statement, A Sporting Future 
for All (DCMS 2000), was clear that the organizational infrastructure of sport 
was considered to be an impediment to achieving the primary policy goals of 
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elite success and the enhancement of opportunities for young people to 
participate in sport. ‘There is a need for a radical rethink of the way we fund 
and organize sport [and to this end] we offer a modernizing partnership with 
the governing bodies of sport’ (DCMS 2000, p. 19). Cooperative governing 
bodies ‘will gain more responsibility. But if they fail to perform against agreed 
targets, then funding arrangements will be reviewed’ (DCMS 2000, p. 20).  
 
Sport England was also to be modernized. It would no longer prioritize its 
delivery role and would adopt a role which was ‘more strategic’ and 
concerned with ensuring that public funds are ‘properly spent’ (DCMS 2000, 
p. 20). Similar conclusions were drawn by the review of elite sport funding 
conducted in 2001 (DCMS 2001a) where the primary concern was to clarify 
the relationship between UK Sport and Sport England and ensure that the 
former was given unambiguous lead responsibility. The need for reform was 
further reinforced by the Quinquennial Review of Sport England which 
recommended, inter alia, that Sport England ‘establish meaningful, outcome 
driven targets against which performance can be measured [and] develop 
agreed and robust reporting procedures that will enable DCMS to measure 
Sport England’s performance against objectives’ (DCMS 2001b, p. 44). The 
work of the Quinquennial Review panel set the agenda for, but was also 
overtaken by, the DCMS/Strategy Unit study (published in 2002 as Game 
Plan) of long-term sports policy. 
 
Game Plan reinforced the imperative of modernization and argued that both 
Sport England and UK Sport needed to concentrate on four key activities: 
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strategy; investment appraisal, contract specification and monitoring and 
evaluation; advice and guidance, especially in relation to capacity building; 
and research and evidence collection. The intended outcome of this 
refocusing was that ‘There should be less micro-management and more 
freedom for partners to deliver against agreed targets’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit 
2002, p. 175). It was recommended that both organizations should be leaner 
and more focused with their councils (i.e. boards) selected for their expertise 
and ‘non-executive skills (i.e. strategy, vision, wide business experience, 
planning scrutiny and leadership)’ rather than their representation of some 
stakeholder interest (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002, p. 175).  
 
As in other policy sectors (e.g. countryside policy) (Ward and Lowe 2007), 
Game Plan acted as a high-level strategy for setting out government’s 
modernizing ambitions to rationalize the operations of sport NDPBs, and the 
organizations and institutions expected to deliver front line sport and physical 
activity services (e.g. local authorities, schools, NGBs). In essence, this meant 
that, for a policy sector characterized for many years by incoherence, 
divisiveness and conflicting objectives (cf. Green 2006; McDonald 2000; 
Roche 1993), some semblance of clarity was about to be ‘imposed’ upon it. 
Throughout these years of ‘incoherence’, government (both Conservative and 
Labour) at best viewed the sport policy sector as a peripheral priority and at 
worst treated it with outright disdain. Today, however, modernization of the 
sector is in part about the current high political salience of sport and physical 
activity programmes and, as such, as Freeden (1999, p. 46) notes in a related 
debate on the ideology of New Labour, the government ‘has adopted Etzioni’s 
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preference for guided persuasion over [outright] coercion’. Modernization of 
sport thus serves the dual purpose of a grand project of national renewal (a fit, 
healthy and active population and the hosting of the 2012 Olympic Games), 
and as a concerted approach to improving the performance of public services 
through administrative rationalization and greater coordination and targeting 
of clarified objectives for delivery of sport programmes at grassroots levels. 
 
Part of the process of transforming Sport England into a modern organization 
and also one capable of acting as the driver of modernization of the governing 
bodies was achieved through change in personnel, with the Chief Executive 
and Chair of the Council both departing to be replaced by Roger Moffett, as 
CEO, and Lord Carter, as chair who came from a business background. 
Carter’s initial impression of Sport England was ‘that it was bureaucratic, 
relatively passive…’, adding that ‘they used to remind me of little baby birds 
sitting with their beaks open expecting someone like the Chancellor to fly over 
and drop a worm of money into their mouths because they were deserving’ 
(quoted in The Guardian 2006, p. 9). Part of the process of modernization was 
also achieved through a series of reviews of Sport England designed to 
change radically its culture and management practice.  
 
In 2003 Sport England established a Modernization Project Board chaired by 
the Head of Sport Division in the DCMS with a brief to implement the 
recommendations of Game Plan and the Quinquennial Review. In the 2004 
report, The Framework for Sport in England, it was argued that 2003 had 
been a transformative year for Sport England producing ‘A new, modernized 
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Sport England ready to provide strategic leadership for sport in England – a 
new board, a new clarity of purpose, and a commitment to bust bureaucracy’ 
(Sport England 2004b, p. 6; see also DCMS 2004). Perhaps the 
transformation is best indicated by the structure of the funding agreements 
signed between Sport England and UK Sport with DCMS, both of which have 
much clearer statements of targets, baseline data, milestones, and 
performance measures than previous equivalent documents such as 
corporate plans (Sport England 2004c; UK Sport 2003).  
 
More recently the Treasury/DCMS and the National Audit Office (NAO) 
commissioned two reports which reviewed the extent of change and the work 
still to be done. The Treasury/DCMS (Carter) report (2005) observed that 
Sport England had ‘radically restructured, devolving decision-making through 
9 Regional Sports Boards’ and that UK Sport [had] reviewed its functions and 
streamlined the organization’ (p. 13) but complained that ‘measurement of 
baseline data and evidence through research is limited: managing 
performance is difficult and allocating resources at local level is not well 
informed’ (p. 17). The tone of the Carter report was echoed by that from the 
NAO which examined the support provided to elite athletes by UK Sport. On 
the one hand UK Sport was congratulated for meeting its performance target 
for the Athens Olympic Games while on the other hand the report identified ‘a 
number of …. concerns with the way in which the performance framework is 
operating in practice’ (NAO 2005, p. 4). UK Sport was recommended to 
‘secur[e] a better return on investment’, use ‘independent experts to 
undertake periodic evaluations of programmes’, and cooperate with the home 
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country sports councils to simplify the funding system (p. 4). The NAO report 
was reinforced by a report from the House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts (2006) which criticized UK Sport for requiring NGBs to set clear 
performance targets while not setting any for itself or else setting over-
simplified targets. UK Sport was also criticized for mis-reporting previous 
medal performance over a three year period. 
 
The accumulation of momentum for reform derived from these various reports 
concerned specifically with the effective delivery of sport policy objectives was 
augmented by the Gershon review which examined the use of resources 
across government. The Gershon review set targets for cost savings and staff 
reductions and not only stressed the importance of moving resources to 
service delivery functions, but also emphasized the importance of ‘auditable 
and transparent measures of performance’ (HM Treasury 2004, p. 32). The 
changes manifest at Sport England and UK Sport over the past four to five 
years clearly reinforce the view that Gershon’s recommendations have had 
major consequences for both organizations.  
 
And, although not a key concern of this article, it is notable that the 
modernization reforms experienced by Sport England and UK Sport have also 
had consequences for organizations and institutions closer to the point of 
service delivery. First, new sports indicators developed by Sport England and 
the Audit Commission for inclusion within the comprehensive performance 
assessment2 regime for local authorities have resulted in the implementation 
of a raft of target-driven sport and physical activity objectives under three key 
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indicators: i) raising levels of participation; ii) increasing volunteering 
opportunities; and iii) providing greater opportunities for easy access to a 
range of quality sports facilities (Institute of Sport and Recreation 
Management [ISRM] 2006). Running alongside the implementation of targets 
is the implementation of two major new surveys – Active People3 and Taking 
Part.4 The Active People survey in particular aims to provide local authorities - 
for the first time ever - with ‘results [that] will make a major contribution 
towards establishing evidence-based policy in sport’ (ISRM 2006, p. 2).  
 
Second, through the PE, School Sport and Club Links (PESSCL) strategy 
schools are now subject to annual auditing of their progress towards 
achieving government’s target for 85 per cent of children (5 to 16 years) by 
2008 to experience at least two hours of high quality sport and PE provision 
within and beyond the curriculum each week. Third, NGBs, key delivery 
agents for government’s Olympic ambitions (UK Sport 2006b), as well as for 
social policy-related objectives in areas such as health, crime, community 
cohesion and social inclusion (Sport England 2006), are also grappling with 
the consequences of the modernizing reform of Sport England and UK Sport. 
For example, UK Sport’s current ‘No Compromise’ funding strategy for elite 
athlete development requires NGBs to meet stringent performance-related 
targets aligned to winning (Olympic) medals on the international stage (UK 
Sport 2006a). Some of the ramifications for NGBs in this respect are 
considered in our ensuing analysis of the consequences of modernization for 
UK Sport. In order to evaluate the nature and degree of these consequences 
for both Sport England and UK Sport, in the next section we narrow our focus 
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to an analysis of these two main NDPBs for sport in England. The evaluation 
of both NDPBs is organized as follows: first, we examine the source of the 
momentum for modernization in the sport sector; second, we interrogate how 
the general concern to modernize was translated into a series of objectives 
specific to each NDPB; third, the defining aspects or landmarks of 
modernization are identified; finally, we assess whether the modernization of 
Sport England and UK Sport is ‘complete’, or whether the ‘modernization of 
sport’ remains a work in progress.  
 
[A]Sport England 
 
[B]Sources of momentum for modernization 
 
Before interrogating the nature and degree of the consequences of Labour’s 
modernization project on Sport England, it is worth commenting briefly on 
sport’s remarkable rise in salience to government in recent years (cf. Green 
2006; Green and Houlihan 2005). In so doing, it is possible that we might 
uncover the sources of the general momentum for the modernization of the 
sport sector. Writing on the issue of ‘Tony Blair and the jargon of 
modernization’, Finlayson (1999, p. 24) points to Labour’s ‘frequent 
connection of modernization with the nation’, which invokes a particular brand 
of ‘celebratory patriotism’ (p. 13). Indeed, in Blair’s first speech to the Party 
conference after becoming Prime Minister he argued passionately for Britain 
to be ‘nothing less than the model twenty-first century nation’ (Blair 1994, p. 
1). It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that a Prime Minister who, according to 
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a former senior official at Sport England, is ‘passionate about sport’ (Interview 
A, 4 July 2005), and who is nothing if not pragmatic about instrumental policy 
making (see Newman and McKee 2005 for a pertinent example in respect of 
the public library service), should ‘engage’ with a policy sector (sport) that has 
moved from a peripheral policy concern to one that is currently promoted as a 
cross-cutting solution to policy problems in key sectors such as education, 
health, crime, and social inclusion (Green 2006; Sport England 2006).  
 
Indeed, Tony Blair states in the Foreword to Game Plan, ‘Sport is a powerful 
and often under-used tool that can help Government to achieve a number of 
ambitious goals’ (quoted in DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002, p. 5). Concerns 
regarding low physical activity rates and rising obesity levels in the population 
generally, and amongst children and young people in particular, are at the 
heart of government’s contemporary engagement with sport (Sport England 
2006). Indeed, Lord Carter argues that ‘we’ve moved from the manual to a 
sedentary society and there are … great arguments to say that sport is part of 
the answer to all the problems that brings’ (quoted in The Guardian 2006, p. 
9). This then is one persuasive argument for Labour’s enthusiastic 
engagement with sport and physical activity policy over the past decade. A 
second and related reason was offered by a senior civil servant in the Sports 
Division at the DCMS, who observed that, in order for government to realize 
its sport and physical activity goals, it must ensure that the organizations 
expected to deliver on these policy goals are modern, professional and ‘fit for 
purpose’ (Interview G, 27 June 2006). 
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There is another other line of reasoning, however, which arguably provides a 
valuable perspective from which we might identify an additional source of the 
momentum for the radical modernization of the country’s leading 
governmental agencies for sport. That is, over the past ten years we have 
witnessed growing political and policy legitimation of, and funding support for, 
the development of the nation’s elite (Olympic) athletes (Green 2004; Green 
and Houlihan 2005). In this respect, the decision by the IOC in July 2005 to 
award London the right to host the 2012 Olympic Games provided significant 
political legitimation for policy decisions taken over the past decade to 
prioritize elite sport development. Indeed, on the issue of political support for 
the 2012 bid, Andrew Rawnsley reports in The Observer (2006, p. 31) that 
‘Blair shrugged aside opposition once he got seized by the notion of adding a 
grand projet to his legacy’. It is the grand, symbolic, almost mythical rhetoric 
used by politicians about elite sport success and the hosting of an Olympics 
Games that interests us here. Such rhetoric is evident in comments by Tessa 
Jowell, then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘who argued that 
a credible bid was crucial to the future not just of sport but of national 
aspiration’ (quoted in The Observer - Olympics 2012 Special Report - 2005, p. 
3).  
 
The winning of Olympic medals and the hosting of a successful Olympic 
Games thus emerge as crucial political referents for the story New Labour 
promotes in its discourse about the construction of a modern twenty-first 
century Britain (cf. Finlayson 2003a, 2003b). In Labour’s first ‘annual report’ in 
1998 modernization was part of the ‘story’ they had to ‘tell about Britain’ 
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(HMSO 1998). We were reminded that, although the country is ‘filled with 
creative, innovative compassionate people’ (HMSO 1998), we had for too long 
‘relied on past glories’ (Finlayson 2003a, p. 85), and now needed to adapt to 
the new world and the global economy. It is not such a great leap then to 
argue that, in prioritizing the development of the country’s elite athletes, and in 
the backing of the London 2012 bid, New Labour seized upon a golden 
opportunity to use ‘success’ at the Olympic Games as an exemplar of its 
progressive project of modernizing the nation - both in the number of Olympic 
medals won, as well as through the process of re-branding the country as a 
‘model twenty-first century nation’, characterized by the successful hosting of 
the world’s major sporting event. 
 
[B]Translating modernization into specific organizational objectives 
 
Signposting the general momentum for the modernization of sport by 
government is one thing. Palpably more problematic is the translation of that 
general momentum into clear objectives for the organizations charged with 
implementing change: in this case, Sport England. To put it another way, was 
the source of the momentum for change wholly external to Sport England, or 
was there already an internal lobby for modernization that not only understood 
the prevailing modernizing climate but was also willing and able to see 
through a radical programme of reform? There is some evidence that within 
Sport England there was a recognition, at least, of the need for reform. For a 
senior civil servant at the DCMS, ‘The Labour Government came in with a 
very clear agenda for sport … and obviously it’s easier for the government to 
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change bodies for which it is directly responsible and in that sense therefore it 
was Sport England and UK Sport that came under the microscope’ (Interview 
G, 27 June 2006). In respect of Sport England, this civil servant went on to 
add that, ‘I can’t honestly say to what extent Patrick Carter’s reforms were 
widely welcomed but I think my impression is that there was a feeling within 
Sport England that … things needed to be sharpened up, tightened up’. And a 
former senior official at Sport England made the point that ‘It was perceived in 
the sector that Sport England was up for change, right for a change in a sense 
of declining incomes, and a new policy framework to do something different’ 
(Interview F, 5 May 2006). A current senior Sport England official also 
provides credence to the argument that Sport England was aware of the need 
for reform in arguing that ‘I suspect that there was a recognition inside the 
organization that things could be better’ (Interview B, 9 March 2006). 
 
While there is some acknowledgement in these observations that there was a 
recognition within Sport England of the need for change, this has to be 
tempered by the former Sport England official’s further insight that the thinking 
behind, and publication of, Game Plan in 2002 indicated a real drive, 
politically, ‘to increase the number of people that do this [sport and physical 
activity] for health reasons, for crime and disorder reasons, so a whole range 
of government policy agendas came together [but] alongside all that, 
government was looking at ways in which its non-departmental public bodies 
could become more efficient’ (Interview F, 5 May 2006). A rather more 
trenchant view was put forward by another former senior official at Sport 
England, who argued that ‘there was a view in the late nineties, early turn of 
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the century, that Sport England couldn’t deliver … you know, we [government] 
don’t trust them’ (Interview A, 4 July 2005). Moreover, although this 
respondent acknowledged that the Quinquennial Review was important, it 
‘was not tough enough … so just as the Review was coming to an end, 
[Richard] Caborn [Minister of Sport] gets told by Blair, I’m going to get the No 
10 Delivery Unit on this. So all of a sudden we are just coming to the end of 
the Quinquennial Review and these two or three heavyweights arrive from the 
No 10 Policy Unit’. 
 
From this evidence, at least, it appears that the momentum for change at 
Sport England was driven largely by a government which had come to accept 
the salience of sport and physical activity programmes as a solution to a 
number of policy problems, in particular, in health and education. And the 
corollary of this was that Sport England could not be trusted by government to 
effect such large scale reform. In the words of one interviewee, the perception 
of Sport England by government was that it ‘was a constant thorn, no bloody 
good. They’re centralist, dictatorial, prescriptive, London-centric … they’re 
arrogant and they don’t listen’ (Interview A, 4 July 2005). This critique has 
been addressed in part by the government’s devolution/regionalization 
agenda, in particular, the commitment by New Labour to devolve power to the 
nine regions of England in the form of Regional Sports Boards. To paraphrase 
Fairclough (2000, p. 5), does this mean that the centre has given up control in 
respect of the sport sector? Or does it entail a new form of control through the 
shaping and guiding of the conduct of Sport England and its regional bodies 
through new ways of working rather than government controlling directly what 
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these sporting bodies do? In short, is the critique that ‘New Labour’s attitude 
towards power is schizophrenic’ (Davies 2006, p. 249) being played out in the 
modernizing reform of Sport England (and UK Sport)?  
 
A major part of the process of the modernization of Sport England appears to 
be the rationalization of staff and organizational procedures. Thus one of the 
defining aspects of modernization has been the reduction in staff from some 
550 to around 250 today; these redundancies have affected primarily Sport 
England staff at its central London headquarters. This rationalization has been 
driven in large part by the recruitment of senior staff with business 
backgrounds. Pre-dating Lord Carter’s appointment as Chair, was the 
recruitment of David Moffett (a former Chief Executive of the All Blacks) as a 
new Chief Executive, brought in, according to one of our interviewees, 
because ‘he was a hard nose change merchant’ (Interview A, 4 July 2005). 
However, according to this observer, Moffett ‘didn’t understand about sport, 
sport development, didn’t have a clue about that’. Moffett’s agenda for 
modernization included the ‘reduction of back office costs, getting more 
money to delivery, to be more business-like, devolve more and simplify things’ 
(Interview A, 4 July 2005).  
 
The subsequent appointments of Lord Carter as Chair, Roger Draper as Chief 
Operating Officer (who eventually replaced Moffett as Chief Executive), and 
the recent appointments in 2006 and 2007 of a new Chair and Chief 
Executive, both of whom are extolled for their wide business experience (cf. 
Sport England 2007b), all serve to support the broader argument that New 
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Labour is involved in a ‘reinvention of government’ which ‘entails new forms of 
control from the centre based upon business corporation models’ (Fairclough 
2000, p. 5). Another strand of this rationalization following business-led 
models is the clarification of the organization’s strategic focus, resulting in 
‘reducing 75 programmes to just two funding streams’ (Sport England 2004a, 
p. 6). Lord Carter’s business experience once again appears as a dominant 
driving force as, according to a senior DCMS civil servant, ‘it was Carter that 
led the reduction of funding streams at sport England … I mean any 
businessman coming to an organization with a background like Lord Carter 
would see that this is ludicrous’ (Interview, G, 27 June 2006).  
 
In order to operationalize these new ways of working, Sport England has 
adopted the business techniques of performance management and key 
performance indicators in order to provide measurable outcomes upon which 
its ‘performance’ might be judged. Thus, for a former senior Sport England 
official, ‘if one strand of modernization was strategic clarity and vision, a 
second strand was this thing around performance management … can we 
provide evidence that what we are investing in … is driving that strategic 
agenda’ (Interview F, 5 May 2006). As noted, two major new surveys, Active 
People (Sport England) and Taking Part (DCMS), are now at the heart of 
building this evidence base for sport. Overall this type of reform is very much 
about increasing accountability throughout the sport sector. As a former 
senior Sport England official related, ‘Carter’s focus at every level … is to 
have clear accountability and responsibility, and if people don’t deliver, then 
they don’t get the money’ (Interview A, 4 July 2005). The spectre of sanctions 
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for not meeting targets under this new, ‘modern’ regime was also endorsed 
unequivocally by a senior DCMS civil servant who stated that: 
what you’re finding in sport is that the government has got a very clear 
idea what it wants, and through the DFAs [Departmental Funding 
Agreements] in particular, this is what we want them to do. So, the 
funding agreement spells out what we want to do, and we monitor very 
closely that they [Sport England and UK Sport] are delivering what we 
want. (Interview G, 27 June 2006) 
The drive for accountability is very much in line with New Labour’s rights and 
responsibilities agenda, which according to Fairclough (2000) combines a 
moral discourse with a contractual discourse. The distribution of rights and 
responsibilities is interpreted metaphorically as a ‘contract’ or a ‘deal’ between 
government and society (or individuals and organizations). Or, as Gordon 
Brown (1998) put it in a parliamentary speech on a forthcoming spending 
review, ‘all new resources should be conditional on the implementation of 
essential reforms; money but only in return for modernization’.  
 
In the sport sector, Lord Carter introduced the term, ‘spine of accountability’, 
as a guiding framework within which Sport England should operate, and which 
captures neatly not only the new expectations from government of its NDPBs 
but also from those bodies (e.g. NGBs, local authorities) in receipt of public 
monies further down the ‘sporting foodchain’. At local authority level the 
introduction of a new performance management framework – Towards an 
Excellent Service (TAES) – for culture/leisure services (within which sport is 
located) is characteristic of the contemporary environment within which sports 
 26 
organizations now operate. As explained by a Sport England official, at the 
heart of TAES is ‘the development of national performance indicators that 
align local delivery with national priorities’ (Interview B, 9 March 2006). For 
this official, the modernization of Sport England has percolated down the 
‘spine of accountability’ and evolved into an agenda of ‘continuous 
improvement’ for local authorities.  
 
Under conditions set out by the latest comprehensive spending review it is 
clear that ‘government intends to improve public services through 
performance management’ (Allison 2004, p. 23). Thus the development of 
TAES and its related key performance indicators (such as percentage 
increases in sport and physical activity participation rates, increased numbers 
of volunteers in sport, and providing greater choice and opportunity for sport 
and physical activity), was in large part aimed at convincing the Audit 
Commission to include sport in the ‘culture block’ in the comprehensive 
performance assessment (CPA) for local authorities. There is, however, a 
certain inevitability in this process, which appears to preclude any dissenting 
voices: within the CPA framework, local authorities ignore culture/leisure/sport 
services at their peril. According to one of our interviewees, if a local authority 
is classified: 
as poor or weak it loses its excellent tag. So some local authorities with 
the excellent tag, what this will force them to do, is not to ignore culture 
… in effect, it’s a back door way of making the service statutory. It’s not 
making it statutory but they have to do it because if they do not they 
are going to lose their money. (Interview A, 4 July 2005) 
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Moreover, as a Sport England official explained, ‘where the CPA identifies 
serious weaknesses, the first stage is to try and encourage them [local 
authorities] to drive their own improvement. If that fails, then they go into 
special measures’ (Interview B, 9 March 2006). In short, as this respondent 
went on to add, if a local authority is categorized as ‘failing’, then central 
government ‘takes over … and it [local authority] can only do what it wants to 
do by getting permission from the government to do it’. Put rather more bluntly 
by a former Sport England official, ‘there is now an intense focus on 
performance management at this level [national] and this is going to filter 
down [to regional/local levels], so much so that County Sports Partnerships 
now have to deliver TAES, and you have got to deliver otherwise you don’t 
get any money’ (Interview A, 4 July 2005).  
 
Thus these increasingly contractual arrangements, from the DCMS to the 
Sports Councils, down through the spine of accountability to County Sports 
Partnerships, to NGBs, to local authority culture/leisure services require an 
acceptance of the rules of the game. Under New Labour’s modernization 
project, to not play this game indicates that an organization/service is anti-
modernization, out-of-touch and ‘conservative’. It also means, more 
pragmatically, that an organization will be named and shamed, and fail to 
acquire the requisite high CPA categorization (3 or 4 star rating) with the 
consequent likelihood of funding restrictions in the future. The paradox of this 
scenario is captured by Finlayson (2003a, p. 86), who argues that ‘To 
modernize is to create a situation in which people are able to deploy 
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themselves, or be deployed, in a way that maximises their output’. This is very 
much in line with the TAES framework and the ‘continuous improvement’ 
agenda now promoted by Sport England. Yet, as Finlayson (2003a, p. 94) 
also observes, ‘Accompanying the decentralization of modernization is the 
centralization of control through the introduction of ever more rigorous targets 
and more complicated systems of performance measurement’. Thus, although 
a central plank of the modernizing reform agenda of Sport England was to not 
only devolve power but also to empower its constituent organizational 
‘partners’, such as NGBs, it appears that this has yet to be fully realized. 
According to one interviewee, ‘I get the impression that Sport England is 
reverting to type [and] that if this [reform] is a mechanism to control and not to 
actually delegate … then all the power, even more power is here than it was 
before’ (Interview A, 4 July 2005). Such evidence is very much in line with one 
strand of Davies’ (2006, p. 254) critique of the shortcomings of New Labour’s 
devolutionary agenda: ‘the growing nakedness of state coercion’. 
 
[B]The future of the modernization project 
 
There is clear evidence here then of the consequences of the fundamental 
modernizing reform of Sport England in particular, and the sport sector more 
generally. Our final area of interrogation in this section concerns whether or 
not this project is complete, or whether there is still some way to go before 
Sport England is perceived by government as a modern, fit-for-purpose 
organization. While Lord Carter’s comment that ‘We have made the changes, 
[at Sport England] but not without a lot of pain’ (quoted in The Guardian 2006, 
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p. 9) is indicative of a less than smooth transition and acceptance of reform, it 
does not tell us much about whether there is still more work to be done. 
However, one of our interviewees commented that: 
I think we’re at another watershed … we’ve achieved quite a lot over 
three years, turning back office money into front line [investment] but 
the whole thing now depends on moving forward to that next stage, 
sustaining investment in the right things, really delivering on that 
performance management thing over a sustained period. (Interview F, 
5 May 2006) 
A Sport England official also valorized performance management techniques 
and focused on the need to embed the ‘continuous improvement’ agenda at 
regional/local levels. Interestingly, this respondent’s comments also give 
credence to our recourse above to the language of coercion and control. 
Commenting on ‘the next stage of our evolution’ of embedding the culture of 
CPA into local authority service departments, this interviewee argued that: 
if we’re [sport] going to stay in the CPA, [there needs to be] 
improvement planning to get better for those that aren’t bad, and 
inspection and intervention for those that need help to be where they 
want to be. So it goes from complete freedom to complete control 
depending on how well you perform. (Interview B, 9 March 2006) 
Such comments invoke New Labour’s rhetoric of ‘earned autonomy’, which in 
itself raises questions of autonomy on whose terms? Along the ‘spine of 
accountability’, for Sport England, NGBs and local authority service 
departments, ‘autonomy’ is currently circumscribed by a series of targets 
tightly ‘controlled’ by central government. There is also a sense that, whatever 
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is achieved in the meeting of predefined targets, there will always be more for 
Sport England, and other sports organizations to do. Indeed, Andrews (1999, 
p. 17) argues that ‘Modernization is the ideology of the never-ending present’. 
Evidence that modernization does not have an end is clear from a Sport 
England official, who maintained that ‘Modernization is a continuous process 
but I prefer to call it the improvement agenda’ (Interview B, 9 March 2006). On 
the other hand, a former Sport England official offered a rather more sceptical 
appraisal of the future. In respect of the efficacy of Lord Carter’s ‘spine of 
accountability’, this official maintained that ‘I still think there’s a big job to be 
done in joining this up in sport … there are still disconnects with this between 
government bodies and the Regional Sports Boards and the County Sports 
Partnerships, and between what’s going on in school sport’ (Interview A, 4 
July 2005).  
 
Finally, and perhaps somewhat ironically, the recent lack of clarity about what 
is to be ‘measured’ within parts of the new regime of performance 
management within which Sport England currently operates has been 
replaced by a narrowness and precision which has substantial implications for 
sport policy. Although the DCMS official explained that the ‘area where further 
work is required is around physical activity, the lead department for that is the 
Department of Health, but our PSA [Public Service Agreement with Sport 
England] is around driving up participation in sport’ (Interview G, 27 June 
2006). It is now clear that sport is required to contribute to the achievement of 
physical activity targets. In 2007 Sport England announced that its target was 
to increase participation in physically active sport by one percentage point 
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each year to 2012, thus removing funding from sports, such as fishing, which 
are considered to involve insufficient physical activity. It appears then that 
Sport England is now working within what Rose (1999, p. 22) terms, ‘a space 
of regulated freedom’. The contractual arrangements inscribed in the PSA 
target between Sport England and the DCMS prescribe what is to be 
measured, i.e. physically active sport. Within this environment of demarcated 
freedom there is little space for the professional autonomy of Sport England 
officials to adopt a more inclusive view of sport and physical activity given the 
government’s stated aim in this sector ‘to contribute to … areas such as social 
inclusion … and to build stronger communities’ (Tessa Jowell, quoted in 
DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002, p. 6, 7).  
 
[A]UK Sport 
 
[B]Sources of momentum for modernization 
 
The scale of modernizing reform undertaken at and by UK Sport has not been 
as wide-ranging or cut so deeply, regarding staff reductions/changes and 
organizational procedures and objectives, as that experienced by Sport 
England. Nonetheless, over the past five or six years, UK Sport has 
undergone a process of modernization that bears many of the hallmarks of 
Sport England’s experience. Perhaps the most compelling explanation for 
disentangling the different experiences of the two organizations is provided by 
a UK Sport official who argued that ‘the task for Sport England was 
significantly more difficult than for UK Sport because of who they were, 
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because of their track record, because of the culture and reputation that they 
had in certain quarters’ (Interview D, 23 March 2006). This respondent went 
on to add that Sport England’s reputation was one of being ‘unwieldy, they 
weren’t helpful, bureaucratic, pots of money, running after initiatives, all of 
that’. Summarily, as discussed, Sport England was perceived by government 
as an organization in need of serious reform.  
 
Although the level of disdain shown by government for Sport England was not 
as evident in respect of UK Sport, it is clear that this organization, established 
as recently as 1996-1997, was also perceived by government as in need of 
modernization. As the same UK Sport official explained, ‘The driver for UK 
Sport, and the modernization of the Sports Council [Sport England], came 
about because of the higher government agenda [of modernization] and that 
was something that was very much expected’ (Interview D, 23 March 2006). 
More specifically, there were evidently concerns about the organization’s 
performance at the highest levels of government. According to a senior UK 
Sport official, the genesis of government’s concern emerged at a Cabinet 
meeting, chaired by the Secretary of State for the DCMS, ‘which was a very 
unpleasant affair, where there was a considerable amount of unpleasantness 
about UK Sport, let’s put it that way, about its role, it’s place in the order of 
things’ (Interview E, 7 April, 2006).  
 
[B]Translating modernization into specific organizational objectives 
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These general concerns from government for reform at UK Sport found 
expression within the organization in at least two important ways. The first, 
and arguably the most important, was the appointment, in 2003, of Sue 
Campbell (then acting as non-political cross-departmental adviser on school 
sport and PE to the DfES and DCMS) as Reform Chair. One UK Sport official 
was adamant that it was Campbell’s ‘appointment that signalled the start of 
something very different, that change was about to happen’ (Interview D, 23 
March 2006). As was the case at Sport England, senior personnel were 
replaced. Within months of Campbell’s appointment UK Sport ‘lost’ its Chief 
Executive and Head of Anti-Doping, although it was explained that ‘neither 
were sacked’ (Interview E, 7 April 2006). The second important manifestation 
of reform was an internal review of UK Sport and, again, as was the case at 
Sport England, this meant a culling of staff, internal restructuring, a 
clarification of objectives and the writing of new business plans. The focus 
was on UK Sport’s Performance Directorate, which ‘lost most of its team in 
December 2004’ (Interview D, 23 March 2006). Performance Development 
Consultants (PDC) were renamed as Performance Programme Consultants 
(PPCs) and, crucially, as a UK Sport official explained, ‘the PDC job 
description and focus was totally changed so that almost exclusively the new 
PPCs now focus on world class performance and high performance issues. 
They do not get pulled into general governing body day-to-day issues such as 
governance’ (Interview D, 23 March 2006).  
 
This particular strand of reform is very much in line with the recent sharpening 
of UK Sport’s wider strategic goals. As noted earlier, in 2006, as part of its bid 
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to the Treasury for increased funding for 2012, UK Sport set out its ‘No 
Compromise’ approach. The No Compromise approach is unashamedly about 
achieving Olympic success, and one crucial aspect of this strategy is to 
ensure that the organizations upon whom UK Sport relies to deliver this 
success - NGBs – are modern, fit-for-purpose and professional. UK Sport has 
made it very clear that over the next four to five years its No Compromise 
investment strategy for Olympic sports will target ‘resources solely at those 
athletes capable of delivering medal-winning performances’ (UK Sport 2006a, p. 
1). This new funding strategy clearly epitomizes a narrative or storyline 
constructed around a broader discourse of ensuring elite sport success in 2008 
and in 2012 in particular. A recent press release from UK Sport helps to make 
the point (UK Sport 2006b). UK Sport’s Chief Executive stated that ‘we must … 
ensure that the money is not wasted – huge amounts of public funds are being 
invested and our job is to challenge the sports [NGBs] to spend it to maximum 
effect’ (quoted in UK Sport 2006b, p. 1). 
 
UK Sport’s readiness to intervene into governing body affairs is not new 
however. Between 2001 and 2005, it invested £5 million of Exchequer funding 
into 114 UK-wide governing body projects as part of its dedicated 
Modernization Programme for NGBs (UK Sport 2005). As a UK Sport official 
explained, ‘it’s in our interest to make sure [NGBs] are in good shape … we 
need to support and assist these governing bodies but at times we also need 
to influence and intervene’ (Interview D, 23 March 2006). Moreover, this 
official went on to add that part of the rationale in this respect was to reduce 
NBGs’ dependency on UK Sport; for them to become much more self-
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sufficient, but at times this amounted to ‘enforced self-sufficiency’. Another UK 
Sport official confirmed the importance of shaping the ways in which NGBs 
use the funding drawn down from UK Sport: ‘It’s about us trying to, you know, 
influence, be assertive at times, be supportive at others … our biggest risk in 
our risk register is the fact that we have to achieve through other people’ 
(Interview C, 10 March 2006). The shaping and guiding of NGBs’ conduct and 
the threat of funding reappraisals if NGBs fall short of the high standards now 
required under the No Compromise approach, draws attention to one of the 
central insights of governmentality research. That is, as a government 
agency, UK Sport’s power does not rely ‘upon the traditional Hobbesian 
means of sovereignty plus coercion’ (Davies 2006, p. 254), but draws 
increasingly on a range of disciplinary techniques of manipulation.  
 
In respect of the ways in which modernization translated into tangible 
objectives, one notable area of concern, as explained by a senior UK Sport 
official, was the ‘growing disquiet from the home countries … and the issues 
of devolution’ (Interview E, 7 April, 2006). Home country (England, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland) interests in conflict with UK/GB level interests 
has bedevilled the organization and administration of sport in the UK for many 
years (cf. Green and Houlihan 2005). At the heart of the issue is the conflict, 
mainly at NGB level, where a NGB has a UK-wide remit but also has 
representatives on its governing board from the four home countries. As one 
UK Sport official argued, ‘you cannot go into that boardroom and be fully 
committed to that British [UK] entity if you are carrying your home country 
agenda … there is a conflict of interest’ (Interview D, 23 March 2006).  
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To take one prominent example, the sport of swimming has long grappled 
with the enduring problem of the role of the Amateur Swimming Federation of 
Great Britain (ASFGB). Historically, the ASFGB’s primary function had been 
the selection of teams for international events where England, Scotland and 
Wales compete as Great Britain. For many years the relationship between the 
ASFGB, and the more powerful and wealthier governing body for the sport in 
England – the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) – was ‘beset with 
organizational, administrative and financial ambiguity’ (Green and Houlihan 
2005, p. 133). In 2000, following numerous reviews over the past 30 years of 
the ASA/ASFGB relationship, the ASFGB was reconstituted as a limited 
company and branded as British Swimming. The ASFGB is now 
constitutionally distinct from the ASA, with a wholly-owned subsidiary 
company – High Performance Swimming Ltd – set up to administer National 
Lottery funding. A very similar issue also plagued UK Sport at its governing 
council level. However, one of Sue Campbell’s significant achievements was 
to restructure the council so that the Chief Executives of the four home 
country Sports Councils no longer have a place on what is know known as the 
UK Sport Board. According to a UK Sport official, this is a ‘system … which 
now works’ (Interview D, 23 March 2006). 
 
Overall, then, UK Sport has not experienced such a traumatic and wide-
ranging programme of modernizing reform as Sport England. However, such 
is the importance placed upon securing a successful outcome (i.e. defined 
medal targets) at Beijing (2008), and London (2012) in particular, by 
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government it is not surprising that UK Sport has also been compelled to 
reform and sharpen its strategic focus. Once again, we have evidence of 
recourse to business techniques in order to achieve such reform. As one UK 
Sport official explained, ‘there is no big bang to modernization because it’s 
about good business management … being good custodians of the funds … 
being efficient and making sure that we get value for money out of the things 
we purchase’ (Interview C, 10 March 2006). In UK Sport’s 2006 Annual 
Review the organization’s Director of Performance not only helps to 
substantiate the contemporary valorization of business techniques but also 
draws attention to UK Sport’s ‘expectation’ that NGBs ‘perform’:  
We are using our expertise and a modern business approach to help 
create a world class environment … [but] As we are responsible for 
public funds, it is crucial that sports are ‘fit to deliver’ … [and] We will 
not shy away from withholding funding from any sports that do not 
meet [the set] criteria. (quoted in UK Sport 2007, pp. 20-21)  
 
[B]The future of the modernization project 
 
Finally, is the modernizing reform of UK Sport over, or is there still work to be 
done? One UK Sport official explained that ‘I think we’re nearly there … the 
fact that we’ve got a performance management system across the whole 
organization … that’s a key difference’ (Interview D, 23 March 2006). With 
regard to building more effective relationships with NGBs, which has been/is a 
key strand of UK Sport’s broader programme of modernization, this 
respondent argued that ‘there’s still a lot of work to do’ but NGBs are ‘now 
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much more professionally set up … it’s still not quite right but at least it’s a 
step in the right direction’. It was also explained that NGBs now go through a 
‘self-assurance process which requires them to reflect on what they have and 
haven’t done … but to be very honest, and it’s been interesting, I think it’s 
been a very good process because it puts the responsibility back on to them’.  
 
Thus, on the one hand, NGBs receive funding and support from UK Sport to 
modernize and to work towards greater autonomy in the ways in which they 
work. On the other hand, however, there is now a much greater expectation 
from UK Sport that NGBs are instrumental in their own self-government and 
engaged in the reflexive monitoring of their actions such that they are able to 
‘account for what they do when asked to do so by others’ (Giddens 1995, p. 
35) Thus, as previously noted, power is exercised not only by the capacity to 
demand accounts but also an acceptance of the need to provide them. Choice 
is tightly regulated, though the extent of regulation is disguised by the 
powerful rhetoric of enhanced agency under New Labour, resulting in what 
Rose (1999, p. 154) refers to as a double movement of responsibilization and 
autonomization. This process has no end. All public sector organizations that 
receive government funding – and not just those in the sport sector - are now 
caught up in a vortex of ‘continuous improvement’ for, as one UK Sport official 
acknowledged, ‘we have to continually improve’ (Interview C, 10 March 2006), 
and for another, ‘the improvement agenda around the sector is … probably 
growing to be almost the only thing we do’ (Interview B, 9 March 2006). 
 
[A]Conclusion 
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It is readily acknowledged that both Sport England and UK Sport, for much of 
the 1990s, lacked a clear organizational rationale, and that Sport England 
(and its forerunners) in particular had been at serious risk of being abolished 
on a number of occasions. Yet the modernization process is treading a fine 
line between defining a clear set of organizational objectives and lapsing into 
‘excessive formalization’ which can prove to be ‘organizationally dysfunctional 
[by] diverting energies away from service and programme delivery’ (Painter 
1999, p. 97). Particularly with regard to Sport England there is a danger that 
‘measurement becomes everything and judgement become nothing’ (Lipsey, 
quoted in Gray and Jenkins 2001, p. 209). 
 
And despite its modernizing reform of Sport England and UK Sport an enduring 
dilemma remains for government. That is, as UK Sport strives to realize its own 
very stringent objectives of 60 medals and fourth place in the Olympic medal 
table in 2012, reconciling the Scylla of Olympic medals with the Charybdis of 
improved mass participation in sport and physical activity (cf. Green and 
Houlihan 2005; McDonald 2000) remains a daunting task. Although mass 
participation is primarily the responsibility of Sport England (and the Youth Sport 
Trust), and not UK Sport, the claim that achieving sporting excellence and 
greater participation are mutually compatible policy objectives has not only 
endured over many years but also masked the inherent difficulties in achieving 
both objectives. As Green and Houlihan (2005, p. 189) argue in their study of 
elite sport policy change: 
it is hard to avoid the conclusion that elite sport development and 
achievement on the one hand and mass participation and club 
 40 
development on the other are deeply incompatible functions within the 
policy frameworks current in Australia, Canada and the UK. 
Part of the impact of modernization on UK Sport and Sport England has been 
to clarify what were perceived by government as overlapping and confused 
organizational objectives. Evidence of, or at least claims for, greater policy 
clarity does not immediately eradicate the problem however. In a climate of 
continued and continual rhetoric around the compatibility of elite-mass sport 
objectives, and despite evidence from other countries to the contrary (cf. 
Green and Houlihan 2005; Houlihan and Green 2008), it remains to be seen 
whether ‘modernization’ of the sector is the answer to this thorny policy 
conundrum. 
 
Perhaps the most striking conclusion to emerge from this review is the extent 
to which modernization of Sport England and UK Sport has resulted in the 
narrowing of objectives – a substantial simplification, indeed over-
simplification, of a complex policy field. The UK’s engagement with 
international sport is narrowed to the primary objective of the pursuit of 
Olympic medals while the immensely complex cluster of issues around 
lifelong participation in sport, health and physical activity, and sports club 
development and social capital, is reduced to the pursuit of one percentage 
point increase in participation over the next five years. It is almost as though 
modernization requires simplification on a par with the clarity and simplicity of 
‘bottom-line’ accounting in commercial enterprises. Furthermore, there is a 
clear paradoxical element to the modernization process of Sport England and 
UK Sport as the requirement of certainty of movement toward objectives 
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implied by modernization sits alongside an intense scepticism towards the 
capacity of public sector professionals to deliver certainty for, as Harrison 
(2002, p. 481), notes, ‘professionals cannot provide certainty and are in any 
case not trusted to do so’.  
 
If one important consequence of modernization is the constraint placed on 
professional staff through the routines of audit, KPIs, inspections and the like, 
then a second important consequence is marginalization of sports interests – 
often behind a rhetorical façade of empowerment. Both Sport England and UK 
Sport have replaced board/council members, and some very senior staff who 
were representative of particular sports interests or had a management 
background in sport, with members and staff who possess business 
skills/experience which were often not gained in a sport context. It is arguable 
that, just as Blairite modernization sought to make the state apparatus as a 
whole more ‘business-like’ rather than make business more responsive to the 
needs of people, so too modernization of Sport England and UK Sport is 
designed to make these organizations more attuned to business practice 
rather than more responsive to the partners on which they rely.  
 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the price paid for modernizing Sport 
England and UK Sport and, admittedly, saving them from likely abolition, has 
been to create a democratic deficit. Lines of accountability for both 
organizations are more firmly drawn upwards to government (e.g. through 
mechanisms such as public service agreements) and outwards to commercial 
sponsors than downwards to key ‘partners’ such as national governing bodies 
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of sport (and their traditional stakeholders, e.g. clubs, members, volunteers, 
officials, coaching bodies, area associations and so forth). Today, these two 
increasingly powerful organizations manage through a ‘command and control‘ 
(cf. Newman 2001) regime in order to shape, channel and guide the ways in 
which ‘street-level’ implementation of government sport policy is administered. 
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[A]Notes 
                                                 
1 The Great Britain Sports Council was restructured during 1996-1997. Previously, it had 
responsibility for sport in England, and for elite sport development across the UK. The UK 
Sports Council was also created during 1996-1997, with responsibility for elite athlete 
development, anti-doping, major events and international development. A separate sports 
council for England was also established, known as Sport England. 
2 Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) is the performance management 
framework used by the Audit Commission and central government to measure local authority 
performance and drive improvement in the sector. Local government spends approximately 
£1 billion per year on sport and leisure, more than 50 per cent of the total resources available 
to sport (Sport England 2007a). 
 51 
                                                                                                                                            
3 The Active People survey was commissioned by Sport England and is the largest sport and 
recreation survey ever undertaken. In total, 323,724 people were interviewed (a minimum of 
1,000 in each local authority area) by telephone across England between the period October 
2005 to October 2006. Sport England is now conducting this survey on annual basis. 
4 The DCMS's current Public Service Agreements have a significant focus on increasing 
participation in Arts, Sport, Museums and Heritage, particularly by a range of ‘priority groups’. 
The Taking Part survey is the mechanism for monitoring progress against several of these 
targets. The survey gives detail on adult (16 plus) participation and attendance covering all 
DCMS sectors that will provide the ability to carry out statistically robust analysis at cross-
sectoral, socio-demographic sub-group and regional levels. The Taking Part survey began in 
July 2005 and will run continuously for three years, with an annual sample size of around 
27,000 per year. 
 
